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BONSAIS IN A WILD FOREST? A HISTORICAL
INTERPRETATION OF THE LONGEVITY




Universidad Complutense de Madridb
RESUMEN
En este artículo se presentan los primeros resultados de una investi-
gación en curso sobre la longevidad de las grandes empresas familiares
españolas. Su principal objetivo es proporcionar datos sólidos sobre un
tema en el que abundan más las opiniones que las estadísticas científi-
cas, así como identificar las claves de la supervivencia y competitividad
de las cerca de 250 empresas en que se basa el estudio. Se concluye que
esta realidad no es sólo el resultado de dos décadas de integración eco-
nómica en Europa o de una buena dotación de recursos naturales, sino
también de un largo período de aprendizaje y de la combinación de dos
factores: la especialización en nichos de mercado que no fueron objeto
de interés estratégico por parte del Estado, y la habilidad para consoli-
dar redes personales de cooperación e influencia dentro y fuera del país.
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1 Howorth, Rose and Hamilton (2006). The authors want to express their gratitude for
comments and suggestions received from editors and referees to improve concepts and evi-
dences. They are also indebted in this process with Mary B. Rose, Ellie Hamilton, Andrea
Colli, Jari Ojala, Pablo Díaz Morlán, and Mark Casson.
2 Limited ownership was possible in Spain after the 1829 Code. Today the Spanish lobby
of large family firms Instituto de la Empresa Familiar is working hard to modify the existing
law, or even to create a new mercantile law to allow an increase in the percentage of shares
without voting rights in limited companies in Spain. In this way family firms with high capi-
Palabras clave: Empresa familiar, gran empresa, longevidad, com-
petitividad
ABSTRACT
This study presents the first results of an on-going study of longevity
of large Spanish family firms. Its main objective is to provide solid data
for a topic in which opinions are more abundant than scientific statis-
tics, as well as to identify the keys to the survival and competitiveness of
the almost 250 firms included in the study. It concludes that this reality
is not just the result of two decades of integration in Europe or a fortu-
nate endowment with some natural resources, but the outcome of a long
learning process and the combination of two factors: specialization in
market niches in which the state had no strategic interests and the crea-
tion of personal networks of cooperation and influence within and out-
side Spain.
Keywords: Family firm, large firm, longevity, competitiveness
JEL Classification: D10, J16, M20, N01, N80
1. INTRODUCTION
There is a wide diversity of definitions of what a family firm is, but
most scientists agree that the determining feature is the ownership
structure, in which people linked by kinship ties own the controlling
voting shares or property 1. The way kinship ties are defined varies
depending on cultural factors and may include blood ties as well as spi-
ritual ties. As regards the percentage of voting shares or property needed
to control the firm, these also vary depending on the legal framework
governing entrepreneurial activity in each territory. This has changed
quite substantially in Spain, as in other European countries, in the last
two centuries 2. Some historians have pointed towards the early modern
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tal requirements (needed to innovate and/or internationalize) could open their ownership to
outsiders without losing key controlling rights, the sign of their autonomy and independence.
See interview with Fernando Casado in Bibko (2002): 45.
3 Classic historical approaches are Stone (1977) and Braudel (1982). For an excellent
anthropological approach, see Goody (1983).
4 On the family firm debate see Jones and Rose (1993); Colli (2003); and Howorth, Rose,
and Hamilton (2006: 225-247). On the comparison between some big US corporations and
UK and German firms, see Chandler (1994).
5 James (2006), Casson and Godley (eds.) (2000), Colli (2003).
6 Castells [2000 (ed.), 2004 (ed.)], and Galambos (2005: 1-38).
7 Galve and Salas (2003).
8 Granovetter (1995: 93-130).
times as the age of the first consolidation of family capitalism, linking it
with the rise of the bourgeoisie as a social class. Well-known anthropo-
logists, though, place the establishment of family-owned businesses in
earlier times and in tribal societies 3.
Economists and business historians have rarely considered family
firms as efficient and flexible institutions able to learn from and also teach
to lessons of competitiveness from big corporations. In contrast with big
managerial corporations of some leading economies and sectors of the II
Technological Revolution, family firms appear as losers in the race for
competitiveness in contemporary business history 4. However, in recent
decades, interdisciplinary scholarship on family firms in Europe, the
U.S.A. and Asia, has indicated that in the last 150 years many large and
medium family firms have managed to learn and successfully use organi-
zational skills from big corporations, and at the same time have been able
to maintain family control and values 5. Personal networking has proved a
very efficient tool for building the channels of trust across regional and
national borders so important in international businesses today 6. Rene-
wed studies of the economics of family firms are also revealing some very
important competitive advantages of family firms in the manufacturing
sectors which are very strategic skills in our globalization era: flexibility to
adapt to changes and innovate, cost saving personal networking, and bet-
ter skills to create intangible assets like reputation and brands 7. The study
of the geography and longevity of family firms in a country can, therefo-
re, contribute important insights into the concentration and availability of
human capital in a territory, which is one of the goals of this study.
Over centuries family firms have been the most common ownership
structure across countries and sectors. Relying on a strong basis of trust,
family firms offered the means to coordinate efforts and resources ade-
quately and to face uncertainty 8. Trust-based networks seemed to lose
much of their pre-eminence in the most advanced parts of the world bet-
ween the eighteenth-century and the end of the 1970s as a consequence
of the spread of economic liberalism, the growth of productivity and the
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9 Chandler, Amatori and Hikino (eds.) (1997).
10 On a review of the family firm debate in Rose (1995).
11 Jones and Rose (eds.) (1993), Colli (2003). With diversified regional experiences, of
course. For the UK outdoor trade, see Parsons and Rose (2003) and Parsons and Rose (2004).
For various European countries and sectors, see Fernández Pérez and Rose (eds.) (forthco-
ming).
12 As with the managerial corporations Chandler studied for the US between the mid
19th century and the mid 20th century, in some European family firms changes in technology
and markets led to growth, diversification and vertical integration. However, and in contrast
with the US firms, European family firms remained tightly controlled by people linked by
kinship ties, who started processes of improvement of their technical and managerial trai-
ning. On their productive and commercial changes see James (2006). On the professionali-
zation of management, see Guillén (2004), Puig and Fernández (2003) and an article by these
authors is forthcoming in Revista de Historia de la Economía (Fundación BBVA).
fall of transportation and communication costs linked to the industriali-
zation process 9. It was indeed in the regions and countries where the
new sectors developed earlier and more intensely that the «Chandlerian»
firm emerged. This happened firstly in the United States, Germany, the
United Kingdom and France, and later in the European periphery and
the Far East. As the II Technological Revolution progressed, regions and
firms that remained rooted in the industrialized sectors of the I
Technological Revolution were considered to be dominated by a back-
ward-looking personal and family type of capitalism 10.
This static view, so dominant for many years in debates about
modern business structures, failed to see change and adaptation of the
old family firm structures 11. In many countries, some family firms star-
ted to change their inherited traditional features in a very slow and dis-
perse way. It was such a slow transformation that it was difficult for rese-
archers to identify the changes as a coherent trend across national bor-
ders and sectors. However, these scattered changes were in fact comple-
mentary pieces of a general learning process. In this process many large
and medium family firms adapted their structures and organization to
the impact of technological change and global demand in a way which
resembled, but was at the same time different to, the path followed by
the Chandlerian corporation 12.
Large family firms in Europe, Asia and America learnt to professio-
nalize their family management, to borrow from banks without losing
family control, and many opened their ownership to the public stock
market, particularly during the second half of the 20th century. Those
who benefited most from all these transformations increased their scale,
scope and profits, and contributed to regional wealth.
Management literature indicates that long term family business
groups incorporate four priorities which foster enduring success: com-
mand (senior independence), continuity (adherence to a mission), com-
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13 Miller and Le Breton-Miller (2005: 6).
14 Jones and Rose (1993).
15 Colli, Fernández Pérez, Rose (2003).
16 On Spanish interventionism and isolationism see Catalan (1995, 2003).
munity (unity and concern for employees), and connection (long-lived
external relationships with clients and suppliers) 13. However, from a his-
torical and new institutional economics point of view, which is the con-
ceptual approach of this article, the explaining factors of business suc-
cess and failure identified in a particular place or economic sector can-
not be simply extrapolated to other places or times 14. The interplay of
family firms with their particular environment conditions their priori-
ties to a great extent 15.
This article represents a move towards an improved understanding of
the dynamism shown by family capitalism in Europe during the golden
age of the managerial corporation between the last third of the 19th and
20th centuries. In this period, European family firms learnt new strate-
gies and structures which, mixed with preserved family firm competiti-
ve advantages, allowed survival and success. We approach this process
through the study of the longevity and geographical distribution of the
largest historical Spanish family firms. The Spanish evidence includes
family firms which had operated for many decades under the umbrella
of a highly interventionist and isolationist dictatorship. The obstacles
and difficulties these family firms faced during the central years of the
«golden age of capitalism» were thus probably more important than in
other European countries, where state interventionism took place but
not with the strong and enduring isolationist goals of the Spanish state,
and therefore the efforts towards transformation and change of Spanish
family firms were very different 16.
The article presents original new data about the longevity of 245 large
Spanish family firms and has two main goals. Firstly, to provide solid
data about a topic in which opinions are more abundant than scientific
statistics. Secondly, to demonstrate that the competitiveness of large
Spanish family firms is not just the result of two decades of integration
in Europe or a good endowment with some natural resources, as econo-
mic analysis without historical perspective indicates, but the outcome of
a peculiar combination of two factors that have taken place in Spain
over more than a century: specialization in market niches in which the
state had no strategic interests or public firms (above all during Franco’s
dictatorship), and the creation of personal business networks within and
outside the firms’ regions.
Available economic studies in the field of Spanish family-controlled
manufacturing firms at the end of the 20th century have indicated their
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17 Galve and Salas (2003): 85.
18 Between 1982-1992 the control of the 538 largest industrial manufacturing firms in
Spain varied: in the public sector from 11,7 per cent to 10,5 per cent; financial capital con-
trolled firms from 12,3 to 6,6 per cent; foreign capital firms from 32,5 to 48,7 per cent, and
family controlled firms from 16,6 per cent to 16,8 per cent. In Nadal (dir.) (2003), p. 408.
19 Galve and Salas (2003): 85.
20 On Spanish brands see Murray (2002): 52-53. On the internationalization of large Spa-
nish family firms, Nuria Puig and Paloma Fernández presented first results in «Silent Revo-
lution: The internationalization of large Spanish historical family firms», European Business
History Conference, Geneva, September 2007 (publication forthcoming).
21 Galve and Salas (2003): 98-99, 117 and 190-191. They also indicate, however, high vul-
nerability to external shocks and difficulties obtaining capital from outsiders.
specialization in the consumer goods industries and in relatively low
added value metal mechanical manufacturing, both sectors which are
not very capital intensive 17. Also, a few of these studies have carried out
comparative work to contrast the performance of family owned firms in
the Spanish manufacturing sector with that of non-family firms.
According to these studies, large Spanish family firms were able to keep
ownership control in the industrial sector in a more stable way than
financial and public firms during the difficult years of industrial crisis
and increased foreign competition of the 1980s 18. This happened despi-
te the fact that, according to Galve and Salas, the numbers and percen-
tages of all family-owned firms (large, medium and small) in the total
number of Spanish manufacturing firms fell during the 1990s 19. This
indicates, by the end of the 20th century, high death rates of smaller and
medium firms and a parallel process of concentration of small or ineffi-
cient firms around medium and large family firms, both developments
for which we have scattered qualitative evidence that future research
will have to measure and explain in a more comprehensive way. What is
absolutely clear is the outcome of these processes of change and trans-
formation over recent decades: half of the largest Spanish multinationals
today are family-owned firms and the vast majority of the best-known
Spanish brands on international markets are «family firm made» 20.
This study will attempt to understand not so much this rapid trans-
formation and the internationalization processes of large Spanish family
firms during the last three decades, but rather the historical reasons
behind the high number of large family firms in our country. Economic
studies point towards some possible competitive advantages for con-
temporary manufacturing family firms such as flexibility to innovate,
cost-saving strategies for networking in times of crisis and expansion,
and commercial skills to create brands and reputation 21. However, until
now we have not had a historical overview of the long term reasons
behind the dynamism of Spanish family capitalism. This article is a first
quantitative contribution towards this effort.
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22 We particularly wish to thank Fernando Casado of the IEF, Jesús Casado in Madrid,
and the efforts of the regional associations of the IEF which answered our questionnaire
and, in cases like the Alicante and the Catalan associations, provided excellent information.
23 These are the first results of on-going research, but they are so far the only scientific
data gathered on longevity of Spanish family firms. Most analysis of Spanish family firms
only offer estimates and percentages with no statistical support. Studies of Spanish family
firms which use the firms’ answers to public questionnaires available since the 1990s, like
Galve and Salas (2003), are exceptions. These studies, however, include limited data on the
longevity of firms.
We have created and used our own database of 245 firms and a mul-
titude of scattered biographies and entrepreneurial monographs. The
firms are family owned or managed, large (turnovers in excess of 40
million euros), and historical (having experienced at least one successful
succession process by the end of 2005). The database has been compiled
with information from Actualidad Económica 2006, corporate websites,
published business articles and books, interviews with the Instituto de la
Empresa Familiar (IEF) and with Spanish regional associations of
family firms 22. Despite the scattered nature of the evidence, these are the
only available data gathered on medium and large historical Spanish
family firms 23.
According to our data, in 2005 there were 3,712 firms with a turno-
ver in excess of 40 million euros in Spain. Turnover has been taken as the
main criteria for selecting the largest Spanish family firms. Around
1,000 of them (25 per cent) are family owned or managed. Most of the
firms are small by international standards. Half of these 1,000 largest
Spanish family firms are located in Madrid (56 per cent), and only 16 per
cent in Catalonia.
Because a study of longevity needs to take into account family firms
that have successfully undergone at least one succession process we will
call this group «historical family firms». The view radically changes
when locating the largest historical family firms: 23 per cent of the total
number of firms. 37.7 per cent of these firms are in Catalonia; 14.4 per
cent in Madrid; 7.6 per cent in the Autonomous Community of Valencia;
6.9 per cent in Andalusia; 6,2 per cent in the Basque Country; and less
than 5 per cent in the other Autonomous Communities of Spain (see
Tables 1 and 2). This means that in 2005 the largest Spanish family firms
of all ages were concentrated in Madrid, but large historical family firms
were concentrated in the Mediterranean basin —particularly in
Catalonia.
In the following sections we will offer a preliminary analysis of the
identity, geography, specialization, and longevity of large historical
family firms in Spain. This section will indicate where major competiti-
ve advantage is to be found among large family firms and will identify
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24 This reduction has taken place in other Autonomous Communities such as Castile
and Leon since 2000. This was a successful result of regional family firm lobbies according
to representatives of the IEF. See Corona and Casado (2002: 40-41).
the older and younger firms and regional distribution and specialization.
The questions will then be why and how the older large family firms
have been able to become successful in a very competitive global market,
despite traditional backwardness, isolation and two military dictators-
hips which imposed backward-looking business policies during five
decades of the 20th century. The next section will try to present some ans-
wers to these two questions from a historical perspective, in order to
identify not only transformation and change, but also the factors leading
to such change. We will see that the regional perspective is historically
the most appropriate in order to understand the roots of the competiti-
ve advantage of these firms, as is the case in most of Europe. We will also
use the available scattered evidence of published and unpublished stu-
dies to try to identify the most significant trends of the long learning pro-
cess through which medium and large Spanish family firms were able to
change their inward-looking approach to business for outward-looking
competitive strategies. The final conclusion section will summarize the
major findings, particularly the idea that this dynamism of some large
family firms is not just the result of two decades of integration in Europe
or a good endowment with some natural resources, as economic analy-
sis without historical perspective may indicate, but also the outcome of
a peculiar combination of two factors that has taken place in Spain over
more than a century: specialization in market niches in which the state
had no strategic interests or public firms, and the creation of personal
business networks within and outside the firms’ regions.
2. LARGE FAMILY FIRMS IN 21ST CENTURY SPAIN
As previously observed, in 2005 the largest Spanish firms according
to turnover were geographically concentrated in Madrid. However, the
oldest among them were concentrated in Catalonia. The concentration
in Madrid may reveal the economic and political attraction of the capi-
tal as well as the benefits derived from the reduction in inheritance taxes
experienced in the Autonomous Region of Madrid in this decade 24. In
order to study longevity and thus the skills involved in changing and
adapting to environmental shocks, we have selected firms which have
reached at least the second generation («historical family firms») and
have a turnover of more than 40 million euros. According to estimates
from the Spanish IEF only 15 per cent of these firms had reached the
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25 See Bibko (2002),
26 Many public firms located in Madrid were sold and private firms were able to take
control, as happened in the car and metal industries. On INI and the privatization process
see Nadal (dir.) (2003): 418-421.
third generation in Spain in 2002 25. Table 1 shows the largest 245 firms
which met the requirements explained above in 2005.
Our first observation is related with the geography of historical
Spanish family firms. A significant 68 per cent (167 firms) of our sam-
ple have their headquarters in Catalonia, Madrid, Aragon, the Basque
Country and Valencia. All these territories, with the exception of
Madrid (whose localization advantages are strongly political or bure-
aucratic), have historically been industrial regions with a strong
influence of one-heir traditions. Their branch of activity is, in most
cases, related to the consumer goods industries, construction, services,
and very specialized capital intensive market niches like pharmaceuti-
cals and light metal industries. In Catalonia recent and large family
firms are highly specialized in food and beverages, chemicals and
pharmaceuticals and construction. In Madrid the historical family
firm has a weaker industrial profile with retailing, construction and
communication standing out. As for Valencia, the Basque Country and
Aragon, these regions have rather industrial and diverse profiles. Food
and beverages are by far the dominant activities of those firms located
in Andalusia, Castile, Galicia, Murcia, Navarre and the Rioja region. In
the Balearic Islands, the largest family firms grew up around the foot-
wear industry and later focused on Spain’s principal economic activity,
tourism.
If we turn our attention to chronology in Catalonia, the number of
firms founded before the end of the Spanish Civil War (1936-1939) is 33,
more than a third of the total number of Catalan firms included in the
table (84). It is important to note that many of them were established in
the 1920s. Half of the Catalan firms were set up during Franco’s dicta-
torship and they show a great diversity of economic activities in compa-
rison with the other, much more specialized Spanish regions. In Madrid,
the post-war regime encouraged the growth of groups linked to cons-
truction, distribution and communications 26. However, the surviving
firms have a rather heterogeneous profile. A different view is to be found
in the Northern region of the Basque Country: the dismantling of tradi-
tional industries in the Basque Country has changed its entrepreneurial
landscape in recent decades: accumulated capital and families persist,
but many firms have disappeared. Table 1 suggests that historical family
firms of medium and large size have grown in the shadow of the second
industrial revolution.
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The other regions have diverse profiles, but with some key speciali-
zed historical niche branches. In Valencia, the labour-intensive indus-
tries that once characterized its entrepreneurial fabric are fading, in con-
trast with the rise of retailing, ceramics and construction. In Andalusia,
the engineering firm Abengoa (whose Madrid offices are actually much
larger than those in Seville) overshadows some of the most venerable
and best known manufacturers of sherry and other alcoholic beverages.
The chronology of Aragon’s family firms is similar to that of Catalonia.
In those regions with a strong agricultural profile, (Galicia, Castile,
Navarre, Murcia, and Rioja) we observe a strong presence of agro indus-
trial family firms linked to the canned food industries. It should be noted
that winemaking, an important activity throughout Spain, is practically
absent from our data because most wineries are usually small in both
size and turnover. Banco de Santander is the only survivor in Cantabria,
managed by the second and third generations of the Botín family.
Finally, in the Balearic Islands, both pre-war and post-war firms have
succeeded in adapting to the dramatic transformation of the local eco-
nomy led by tourism. The development of the Canary Islands is quite dif-
ferent.
Although our study is preliminary, it shows that historical firms pre-
sent a high degree of geographical concentration (and thus potential for
collective action), and a relative specialization in diversified labour
intensive and low productive activities (see Table 3). They also show that
the specific endowment of natural resources and human capital in each
region seems to have been of the utmost importance. Table 1 provides
valuable data regarding the key chronological periods when the
currently successful large Spanish family firms were founded. Table 2
summarizes this chronological information to identify the key fertile
periods during which today’s large, successful historical Spanish family
firms came into being. Table 2 shows that from the total 245 family
firms, 82 firms were set up before the end of the Spanish Civil War
(1936-39), and 163 firms after the end of the war. Table 2 indicates four
sub-periods indicating the economic cycles which helped or hindered
the birth of these enduring family firms: 37 family firms were establis-
hed before the 20th century, 45 during the first third of the 20th century,
126 during Franco’s dictatorship and 37 after 1975. The information is
clearly biased in favour of Catalonia, the region with most data. Of a
total of 84 large Catalan family firms, 15 were set up before the 20th cen-
tury, 18 during the first third of the 20th century, 43 during Franco’s regi-
me, and 8 after 1975.
The conclusion regarding chronology from Tables 1 and 2 is clear:
the decades of Franco’s dictatorship witnessed the foundation of half of
the largest historical family firms active in Spain today. However, an ear-
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27 García Delgado (1999).
28 Nadal (2003).
lier period, the first third of the 19th century and the first two decades of
the 20th century, when more than a third of our firms were founded, was
also a very fertile one for large, durable family firms. These data provi-
de evidence to confirm our idea that today’s successful Spanish family
multinationals owe a good deal of their endurance to conditions linked
not just to present-day strategies but to the accumulated inheritances of
the past. The fact that these two particularly fertile periods for enduring
family firms were rather protectionist and isolationist periods in Spain’s
economic history would suggest that, as has been the case in other
industrialized economies of the world like the US, protection in a back-
ward developing economy may help future growth and internationali-
zation, at least for those firms able to combine this protective umbrella
with internal organizational transformations. During the dictatorships
of Primo de Rivera (1923-1929) and Franco (1939-1975), large industrial
firms with the power to lobby the political authorities greatly benefited
from laws which protected national industries and reserved the Spanish
market for Spanish producers 27. These firms were also able to grow
because many of them were able to take advantage (later and with gre-
ater import difficulties than in other European economies) of the mass
production/distribution techniques of the second industrial revolu-
tion 28. They grew slowly compared with the Italian pocket multinatio-
nals of this period, due to great import difficulties, but many showed
great dynamism on international markets before 1936 when they were
forced by the autarky to grow in closer connection with their domestic
market.
In Catalonia there were many examples of medium-sized family firms
which internationalized between the late 19th century and the early
1930s in specialized regionally-embedded market niches like paper-
making, alcoholic beverages, food production, and cork or book manu-
facturing. Latin America and France were the preferred destinations of
this Spanish foreign presence, and some even tried the U.S.A. market.
For instance, Pau Miquel i Costas opened his first distribution establis-
hment in La Habana in 1880, Rafael Guastavino moved to New York and
established the renowned «Guastavino Fireproof Construction
Company» in the 1880s, the Mateu family opened the first subsidiary of
their car factory Hispano Suiza in France in 1912, the Jorba family esta-
blished the significant retail store Maison Jorba in Brussels in 1919, the
Salvat family of publishers spread their exports throughout Latin
America in the first decade of the 20th century, Daniel Carasso establis-
hed the first French factory of the Catalan family firm Danone in
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29 On Antoni Miquel i Costas see Gutiérrez (2006: 198). On Damià Mateu, Joan Jorba
Rius, Pau Salvat i Espasa, Isaac Carasso, Joseph Vilà i Marqués, Joan Miquel i Avellí, and
Esteve Monegal Prat see respectively studies by López Carrillo, Oliveras Samitier, Cabana,
Aymerich, Moreno Castaño, Sala and Puig Raposo in Cabana (eds.) (2006: 264, 308, 331,
343-4, 349, 353 and 451).
30 See Pascual Domènech and Fernández Pérez (eds.) (2007).
Lavallois Pret in 1932 and agreements with foreign partners to transfer
modern technology were signed by the Vilà family of textile industrialists
with French partners in 1923. Perfume manufacturers like Myrurgia of
the Monegal family used to hire French technicians to update their
designs and marketing techniques in the 1920s. The cork producer Joan
Miquel i Avellí managed to transform his «Manufacturas de Corcho»
(founded in 1916) into the European leader of cork manufacturing in
1929. Whereas some of these and similar firms disappeared after the
war, many others were acquired along with their brands and know-how
by surviving firms, and others like Miquel i Costas have endured as
remarkable family firms able to adapt flexibly to new times 29.
The individual stories of many of the firms included in our sample
for the year 2005 show indeed that they have become global actors
thanks to the efforts and experiences accumulated in the two favoura-
ble periods mentioned above. During the first third of the 20th century
some of today’s European and multinational leaders in specialized
branches of production had their roots in Spain: in the food industries
Agrolimen and Calvo; in engineering and construction FCC and
Acciona, in legal services Cuatrecasas, in tourism and travel Barceló
and Iberostar, and in retail store distribution El Corte Inglés, to men-
tion a few. Some of the most important large Spanish family firms
appeared during the 1940s and, especially, during the 1950s: in engine-
ering Ferrovial, Abengoa, Técnicas Reunidas, Talgo and Sener; in paper
production SAICA; the Valencian ceramic and toy producers Lladró,
Porcelanosa and Famosa; pork meat producer Campofrío, or mattress
manufacturer Pikolin.
The next section focuses in more detail on some of the keys behind
the historical process in which these firms took advantage of environ-
mental and institutional factors, and how they survived the darkest
times of autarky and backwardness. It was a long learning process in
which knowledge transfer from abroad and good family team work pla-
yed a crucial role, alongside a third important factor: specialization in
market niches in which costs had been lower than in capital intensive
firms, and in which public firms had no interest 30.
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31 Prados de la Escosura (1991).
32 On education see Núñez and Tortella (eds.) (1993). On infrastructures see Gómez Men-
doza (1982).
33 For several regions and sectors see Nadal and Catalan (eds.) (1994), and Nadal (dir.)
(2003).
34 Cabana (ed.) (2006). Also Puig (2006).
35 Cabana (ed.) (2006).
3. A LONG LEARNING PROCESS OF SURVIVAL AND ADAPTATION
3.1. The 19th and early 20th century: a failed opportunity
for some, time to grow for others
Between the mid 18th and early 20th centuries, the Spanish Empire
collapsed and Spain became merely a peripheral European nation 31.
Spain’s industrialization started in a few outlying regions and under the
aegis of an increasingly protectionist framework that focused on agri-
culture and a few industrial sectors.
The state, however, did little to support education and thereby to
invest in human capital before the 1930s. It also failed to design a ratio-
nal plan of infrastructures aimed at unifying the domestic market 32. In
contrast, the state was extremely lax in fiscal and labour matters, so that
the costs of private enterprise were kept low and the labour market
remained highly flexible in Spain until the first third of the 20th century.
In spite of the fact that the formation of human capital was not favou-
red, labour market flexibility helped to consolidate informal mecha-
nisms of knowledge transfer between firms in industrial districts, as was
happening in most of Europe, and this was the case in some Basque
(metal industries), Valencian (the footwear industry) and Catalan (texti-
le and metal industries) industrial districts during this century and
during the good times of neutrality in the First World War 33.
In the Catalan case, the modernization of the textile, food, metal, and
chemical industries during the 19th and early 20th centuries was carried
out to a large extent by a few prominent families. Bonaplata, Planas,
Güell, López-Güell, Muntadas, Ferrer-Vidal, Serra-Bertrand, Batlló,
Puig-Fabra, Marqués, Sedó, Rosés, Torras and Rivière, among others,
can be mentioned 34. Many of the firms that have survived and become
large and international have their roots in precisely this region. This is
the case of the wine makers Raventós-Codorniu, Ferrer-Freixenet,
Torres, the pharmacists Uriach and Esteve, perfume manufacturer Puig,
paper manufacturers Torras, publishers Godó and Salvat, metal manu-
facturers Roca, steel wire manufacturers Rivière (bought by Celsa in
1999), construction entrepreneurs Roviralta, and optical equipment
manufacturers Cottet 35.
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Roca, a world leading sanitary equipment manufacturer, is a case in
point 36. The small iron workshop of Ignasi Soler, established in Manlleu
in 1830, was transformed several times during the 19th century to adapt
first to steam power and to provide auxiliary services to the textile
industry and house appliances demand, and later, at the end of that cen-
tury, to electric power and new urban demands. From repairing local
horseshoes they were able to repair power looms and steam machines of
the nearby villages, and then learnt to build iron radiators for the
Spanish market. This transformation was unusual, as many ironworks
disappeared in Spain in the industrialization period 37. It was also diffi-
cult, because in comparison with other industrializing regions of peri-
pheral Europe, like Italy or Sweden, the new equipment and raw mate-
rials were expensive, access to bank credit or new energy power was nei-
ther easy nor cheap in their region, and knowledge transfer from abro-
ad was both scarce and difficult to obtain. The second and third genera-
tions of the Roca family of Manlleu learnt new techniques by travelling
during their youth to Barcelona to serve apprenticeships in the best and
most innovative metalmechanic manufacturing houses, many of them
founded by foreigners like Casa Alexander or Talleres Pfeiffer. The Roca
family saved and led an extremely austere life in order to reinvest profits
and pay the costs of technological modernization. Their marriage stra-
tegies with other iron families of the nearby villages favoured the suc-
cession process and the continuation of the small workshop. At the
beginning of the 20th century and just before the Great War some mem-
bers of the fourth generation travelled to France and managed to find
employment in the French subsidiary of the American Radiators
Corporation (ARCo), the world leading manufacturer of iron and steel
radiators and sanitary ceramic equipment. This contact abroad was fun-
damental for the future of the family firm: the fourth generation decided
to close down their old production centre and start anew with the manu-
facturing of radiators for a Spanish market which was increasing its con-
sumption of durable goods (due to the benefits derived from Spain’s neu-
trality during the Great War and increased urbanization). There were
not many competitors in Spain and this represented a great opportunity
to create a new market niche. Team work was crucial: brothers Martí
and Matíes led the production after close imitation of the American pro-
ducts observed in France, while their sister Angela took care of the
accounts and younger brother Josep Roca Soler attended advanced tech-
nical studies at two of the few innovative centres established in Spain in
electronics and engineering: the Instituto Electrónico de Sarrià and the
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Escuela de Ingenieros of Barcelona. The new generation was able to jux-
tapose their different abilities and skills for new purposes. Their diffe-
rentiating strategy regarding Spanish competitors was to combine inno-
vation with technical service and for this reason, in 1929, they establis-
hed a cooperation agreement with the big US corporation from which
they had learnt the new path of industrial activity: ARCo. This agree-
ment meant sharing ownership (51 per cent for the US corporation), but
led them to leadership in the Spanish radiator and sanitary ceramic
equipment market for most of the 20th century. Today, they continue this
strategy of cooperation abroad and are world leaders in their sector.
The great diversity of economic activity in Catalonia was not easily
replicated in other regions where a few specialized market niches deve-
loped in strong connection with the endowment of natural and human
resources 38. Studies for the entrepreneurial provinces of Biscay and
Guipúzcoa, in the Basque Country, have focused on the families which,
over generations, have been involved in mining, shipbuilding, banking,
electricity, and metal and mechanical industries: Ybarra, Chávarri,
Echevarría, Olábarri, Lequerica, Aznar and others. The small family
workshops that contributed so much to the emergence of industrial dis-
tricts specialized in shotguns, bikes, and other special metal manufactu-
res, in places such as Éibar, Placencia, Ermua or Elgóibar have also
attracted the attention of business historians in recent years 39. Family
capitalism was also the engine of growth and secular specialization in
the sectors of wine and canned vegetables in the neighbouring, dynamic
regions of Rioja and Navarre (Trevijano, López de Heredia, Palacios,
Chivite, and others). Yet agriculture was not the only source of business
initiatives. Huarte in Navarre was a forerunner in one of today’s most
dynamic industries in Spain: construction. Some entrepreneurial fami-
lies in the iron and steel-making industries which lasted more than a
century appeared along the Cantabrian coast: Quijano in Santander, and
Tartière and Duro in Asturias.
The use of the regional endowment of natural resources was common
to all regions. It also played a role in Galicia where, from the late 19th
century on, an expansive, internationally competitive salting industry
emerged with the assistance of foreign technology, Catalan family net-
works and enterprising local families (Curbera, Alonso, Barreras, Massó,
Portals, Godoy, Pereira and Calvo). Shipbuilding (Barreras) and banking
(Pastor) were some of the spillovers of this sea-based industry 40. The
most durable and successful entrepreneurial families were also those
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which went abroad and received foreign technological influences and
those which at the same time gathered families, friends and neighbours
to lead processes of change, as was the case of Quijano in Los Corrales
de Buelna. Quijano was a lawyer with aristocratic origins and inherited
wealth who travelled to France in the 1870s and started metal produc-
tion in his agricultural region of Cantabria. He used capital from his
family (mother-in-law, uncle, and close neighbouring friends), the politi-
cal influence his brother had in Madrid (sharing an apartment with
Prime Minister Maura) and the personal support of a Catholic priest
who provided a reliable workforce from the agricultural villages of the
region 41.
In Valencia and Murcia a large number of historical family firms
were created in a similar way on the eve of the Spanish Civil War 42.
Many of these firms operated in relatively new industries such as meta-
llurgy (Devís), toy manufacturing (Payá), wood, cement (Valenciana-
Serratosa), ceramics (Nolla), chemical fertilizers and motion pictures
(Cifesa-Casanova). The tradition of ceramics in Valencia and Barcelona
was indeed a key part of the success of engineer Rafael Guastavino who
built more than 400 hallmark buildings in New York and Boston with
the firm he created in the US in the late 1880s and early years of the 20th
century. This firm survived until the 1960s under the leadership of his
son 43. In Murcia, where a booming mining and metallurgical industry
had positive effects on the business landscape in the 19th century, many
families seized opportunities in auxiliary industries such as glass and
ceramics (Valarino). It was, however, in the traditional sector of the food
industry, also resource-based and less capital-intensive, where most
family firms flourished since the mid century in Murcia: wine in the
Jumilla region, canned vegetables (Moreno, Montesinos, Gómez-
Tornero and Cobarro), and paprika (Albarracín-La Estrella and Flores-
Muelas). The manufacture and commercialization of paprika became a
booming sector with some 47 firms on the eve of the Great War. Largely
dominated by family owned and managed businesses, this industry
quickly responded to the increased demand for esparto sacks (in which
paprika was usually transported).
In Andalusia the main economic activities were related with mining
and agriculture. The best known and most durable Spanish entrepre-
neurial families focused on land and property and wholesale and inter-
national trade, whereas those dealing with mining, metal, textiles and
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food, including some famous names (Larios, Málaga wine exporters,
Carbonell) were rather exceptional. In Western Andalusia, particularly in
Cádiz, the end of the colonial monopoly led many tradesmen to reshape
their activities. The production and commercialization of sherry in the
Jerez-Puerto de Santa María-Sanlúcar de Barrameda triangle was the
main occupation of enterprising dynasties of foreign origins such as the
González (of González & Byass), Terry and Osborne 44.
Family entrepreneurship was also remarkable in the islands 45. The
Fluxà family, in Majorca, constitutes one of the most interesting cases of
adaptation, diversification and survival; from footwear to tourism. In the
Canary Islands, where much of the pre-war entrepreneurship involved
agricultural exports (tomatoes, bananas, tobacco, salted fish or the sal-
ting industry), foreign investors were far more active than local busi-
nesspeople.
Old Castile family firms were much more inward-looking in a region
where the economic basis was extensive agriculture (wheat and flour).
Neither this situation nor the prevalent equalitarian inheritance practi-
ces favoured the continuity of family firms. By the end of the 19th cen-
tury, however, many entrepreneurial families innovated and diversified
in fields as diverse as winemaking (Calderón, Roiz and Lecanda-Vega
Sicilia), metallurgy (Talleres del Duero and Talleres del Tormes), and
chemicals (Mirat). South of Madrid, in the New Castile region, family
firms focused on agriculture (Gonsálvez and Pastor), knives (La
Industria and Sánchez, López), and footwear (Coloma). Interestingly,
much of the local wine and oil industry was promoted by Catalan and
Basque individuals and families. Spanish migration was also a key to the
development of family capitalism in Madrid. Particularly successful
were the firms involved in the manufacture and trade of luxury goods,
banking (Urquijo), publishing (Rivadeneyra and Urgoiti), and consumer
goods such as chocolate (Matías López), beer (Mahou and El Águila),
and soap (Gal and Floralia) 46.
The neutrality of the First World War years plus the protectionist
industrial policies of the 1920s together with the effects of technology
transfer (such as declining prices) during the first decades of the 20th
century, opened new market niches like yoghourt production (the
Carasso family who established the first Danone firm in Barcelona),
reduced the number of small domestic competitors and fostered asso-
ciation with other regional producers (see the case of Quijano in metal
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production in Cantabria). In a few cases the process provided a stimulus
to go international (Salvat and Miquel Avellí in publishing or cork pro-
duction provide examples).
The military upheaval of 1936 and the defeat of the legal Republican
government in 1939 stopped technological progress and internationali-
zation until at least the early 1950s. In compensation, those firms able to
survive benefited from the new rules established in taxation, the labour
market, finance, and reduction of foreign competitors: the domestic
market was reserved for the largest Spanish producers.
3.2. The adaptation of family firms to an isolationist economy
With Franco’s policies, the survival of many firms would be conditio-
ned not so much by ideology as by their size and ability to cope with the
interventionist, arbitrary, and corrupt practices of the new authorities.
Whether family owned or not, firms had to devote great efforts to access
raw materials, import licences and privileged information 47. Bribing and
smuggling became epidemic.
Three different paths of growth opened up for family firms in Spain.
Firstly, those family firms able to provide auxiliary products and services
to the new public holding, the INI (Instituto Nacional de Industria, cre-
ated in 1941) had an opportunity to develop. A second path of growth
was followed by those family firms able to lobby in Madrid to buy
foreign firms or foreign-controlled shares of their firms at low prices.
Usually both paths of growth were open to family firms of medium or
large size before the war, who had good networking skills enabling them
to connect with the new military authorities. A third path of growth was
taken by more modest entrepreneurs who founded new family firms in
sectors with relatively low entrance costs and low import requirements.
Two examples of firms which took the first path were Quijano in the
region of Cantabria, and Rivière in Catalonia, both founded in the last
third of the nineteenth century. Quijano, a pioneer of iron and steel wire
manufactures, created in 1873, progressively reduced traditional pro-
duction and invested in the manufacturing of auxiliary metal products
and motors for the automobile industry. The change was made after the
death of the founder and with professional engineers as the new pro-
duction managers. In 1950, Quijano’s new CEO, Alfonso Alvarez
Miranda, was appointed and technological transformation accelerated 48.
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Rivière, also a steel wire producer, introduced the production of special
springs for car seats for SEAT and special security fences for the U.S.A.
military bases set up in Spain in the 1950s. Rivière introduced Bedaux
scientific production methods in these years to adapt to the new
demand 49.
Roca Radiadores provides an example of the second path of growth
of family firms in this period, that of nationalization of foreign shares of
the firm. The Catalan firm Talleres Roca, S. A., manufacturer of metal
radiators, had signed a partnership with the U.S.A. firm American
Radiator Company (ARCo.) in 1929 and created Roca Radiadores, S. A.,
ARCo. holding 51 per cent of the shares and key control of the manage-
ment in the hands of U.S.A. managers. The three Roca Soler brothers
maintained managerial responsibilities in the factory (Matíes and Martí)
and on the administrative board (Josep). After the war, the law of 24th
November 1939 prohibited foreign investors from owning more than 25
per cent of the total capital of Spanish firms and the Instituto Español
de Moneda Extranjera was created to restrict the use of foreign currency
and avoid economic collapse after the war. Thus, ARCo. was forced to
reduce its ownership in the firm and finally sold everything to the mino-
rity Spanish partners 50.
Not many family firms able to survive the war and start again in the
isolationist times of the 1940s had the money or the political influence
that the above-mentioned family firms enjoyed to get special bank
loans and import permits and invest to obtain successful results in a
poor, though protected, domestic market. The most common path of
growth for family firms in these years was probably the third one,
based on specialization in market niches in which state permits or
foreign imports were not strategically needed, particularly in the con-
sumer goods industries or light construction materials. This specializa-
tion was cheaper and easier as a business strategy in the 1940s, in the
face of import difficulties and with a good endowment with natural
resources and human capital specialized in these sectors. Great efforts
and team work were, however, required to adapt to the new market
situation. Spanish foreign trade declined until the 1950s and salaries
were low. Infrastructures did not improve much despite the need for
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roads and railways to connect the country. Many small workshops had
to stop production due to shortages of power and raw materials 51.
Family firms able to manufacture and sell imaginative cheap food,
small metallic pieces and machinery or cheap (and chaste) publications
to feed the imagination in these conditions were able to blossom. In
1937 Lluis Carulla started manufacturing his Gallina Blanca concen-
trated soup cubes, introduced into Spain by the Swiss firm Maggi, and
made technology transfer from abroad to improve the product using
radio, and later also TV, advertisements to reach the fragmented and
badly connected Spanish consumers 52. Another example of this third
type of family firm was Alfonso Soláns Serrano with his Saragossa
workshop manufacturing metal frames for beds (Pikolin) in 1948 53. Or
Andreu Costafreda Montoliu, a baker working on his own since 1928,
who suffered the loss of his business after the war and realized that this
sector of small and medium family firms could only grow through
collective action. He created Compañía Auxiliar de Panificación, S. A.,
in 1945, in order to represent and legally defend Barcelona’s bakers and
provide them with social protection. His entrepreneurial attitude led
him to found Panrico, one of the largest family firms in the second half
of the 20th century in industrial baking in Spain, which was sold to a
British financial group in 2006 54. Another good example is Planeta, one
of the ten most important publishing corporations in the world. José
Manuel Lara, from Seville, established the firm in Barcelona after the
Civil War, bought the small publishing firm Editorial Tartessos in 1944
and started the publication of best sellers written by American and
Spanish authors, beginning in 1952 what would become one of the
most important marketing tools of the Spanish-speaking publishing
world, the Planeta novel prize 55. Mier, a firm founded by the two
Asturian brothers Pedro and Ramón Mier Allende as a radio shop
(Radio Lyra) in Barcelona in the late 1940s is another example. The
firm performed radio repairs and during the 1950s and 1960s slowly
developed innovative car antennas bought by foreign multinationals
and auxiliary products for radio and TV. During the 1960s and 1970s
the excellent relationships of the Mier brothers with foreign world lea-
ders in telecommunications (Philips and Fuba), their promotion of
associations in their sector and their stable links with Catalan techni-
cal universities helped them become one of the few Spanish family
firms providing auxiliary products for the European Airspace Agency
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(ESA) in 1985 56. José María Ballvé, a final example, created Conservera
Campofrío in the city of Burgos in 1952. The firm specialized in meat
manufacturing and from the outset made great efforts to improve its
commercialization channels. From the traditional sales representative
of the 19th century, the firm invested in their own sales agencies in the
major provincial cities and in trucks of their own 57.
Consumer goods industries or light construction equipment did not
compete directly either with state owned firms or with (forbidden)
foreign firms, did not depend as much as capital goods industries did on
imported inputs and technology, and met a fast growing, domestic and
mainly urban demand. This was to be the very basis of the competitive
advantage of Spanish family firms during the second half of the 20th cen-
tury and to the present day. After the 1950s and during the 1960s they
flourished in construction, printing and publishing, food and beverages,
soap and perfumery, and light metallurgy. Those firms which either esta-
blished enduring relationships with foreign partners or ventured into
foreign markets in spite of the prevailing adverse circumstances, became
leaders at home. Such cases, in the 1960s and early 1970s, are the food
manufacturing firms Panrico (the Costafreda family), Campofrío (the
Ballvé family), Calvo (the Calvo family), and Gallina Blanca (the Carulla
family), and the continuous efforts in this direction of 19th century inter-
nationalized family firms in the beverage industry such as Freixenet (the
Ferrer family), González & Byass and Osborne. The efforts made to
build brands and internationalize were also remarkable in the perfume
(the Puig family) and pharmaceutical (the Esteve family) industries in
Catalonia 58.
Growth needed new strategies and structures as in managerial cor-
porations. Organizational routines, lay-outs and new distribution chan-
nels started to appear and adapt to the new realities of increased com-
plexities in production and distribution. However, increases in levels of
management professionalism took place slowly in comparison with
managerial corporations and with a strong component of family indivi-
duals. In the most capital intensive family firms this process could lead
to conflicts with shop-floor employees and with non-family managers 59.
New organizational routines were often the result of technology transfer
from abroad which was increasingly possible after 1959 through part-
nerships with foreign firms. This strategy allowed growing family firms
to modernize lay-outs without losing ownership and control. This began
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to happen in the 1960s, for instance, in Agrolimen with the American
Purina in the food industry, Rivière, S. A., with Belgian firm Bekaert in
steel wire manufacturing, Mier Comunicaciones with German firm
Fuba, and many others in the chemical and engineering sectors.
Depending on each case, these agreements provided improvements in
technology, marketing and management. Another strategy to get profes-
sional managers among the family members of big family firms in the
1950s and 1960s was the promotion of private business schools (ESADE
and IESE were created in Barcelona in 1958). More rarely in these years,
senior family managers sent younger offspring to receive advanced tech-
nical and professional training abroad, though when this happened it
helped technology transfer as was the case in Rivière or Celsa.
At regional level, through the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s, Catalonia
remained a home to many of the most outward-looking family firms of
the time. Some of the already mentioned firms performed well during
the early phase of the dictatorship: Freixenet, Codorniu, Roca, Rivière,
Torras, Ribera and Myrurgia. Others carried out successful transforma-
tions: Uriach, Esteve, Andreu, Puig, Torras and Roca. Others built their
firms from scratch: Planeta, Carulla, Ferrer, Almirall, Pujol-Ficosa and
Rubiralta-Celsa. Many used US adapted techniques of productivity gains
from textbooks or Spanish engineers trained abroad who worked in the
public and private sector 60.
In the Basque Country, the increasing demand for intermediate and
capital goods since the 1950s has paved the way for many new private
initiatives such as Luzuriaga, Aristrain and Ucín, while it has provided
old firms such as Echevarría with new opportunities to expand. There
are several examples of old and new firms specializing in services, the
most interesting probably being Sener, a leading international enginee-
ring firm founded by the Sendagorta family in 1956 61. Basque family
capitalism also kept growing in the food industry: Koipe, Savin,
Garavilla, Knörr, Elgorriaga and Artiach. In Galicia, a major change in
the local family capitalism, firmly based on canned fish, was the so-
called dairy-drive and the frozen fish-drive. It was in the second half of
the last century that some canned fish firms became vertically integra-
ted groups like the family firm Calvo, while other families ventured into
the promising field of frozen fish by creating vertically integrated groups
like Fernández Sousa with Pescanova, or into the dairy industry 62.
Brilliant as it is, this development has been overshadowed by the more
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recent yet astounding rise of the local fashion industry, whose flagship is
Inditex (Zara and other brands), of the Ortega family whose second
generation is about to take over.
In Valencia, local family firms focused on agro business and consu-
mer goods (footwear, clothing, leather, furniture, cork, toys, and ice-
cream). The main reason was that knowledge and expertise had accu-
mulated over generations in these industries and they were very much in
need of the implementation of advanced technologies. Family capita-
lism, however, also diversified by entering the paper and cement indus-
tries and retailing/distribution later on. The fast growth of the Valencian
economy during the second half of the past century explains, for instan-
ce, the development of Mercadona, Spain’s leading supermarket chain,
founded by Francisco Roig in the 1970s out of his family’s meat busi-
ness. The older and more conspicuous Serratosa family, founder of
Valenciana de Cementos, exemplifies the flexibility of Valencia family
capitalism. Serratosa entered the aviation business in the 1990s, seizing
the twofold opportunity of liberalization in the sector and the astoun-
ding development of the local tourism industry. Their airline, Air
Nostrum, has been operating as a franchise of Iberia since 1999.
In Murcia, many family firms specialized in canned vegetables and
fruit while paprika underwent a severe crisis mainly due to the policy of
self-sufficiency which made it impossible to compete on the internatio-
nal market. In the late 1950s, the situation started to look up for the tra-
ditional local industries. As in most of Spain, here the engines of growth
were the expansion of the domestic market and the increasing integra-
tion of the Spanish economy into today’s European Union. In the 1970s,
big family firms such as García-Carrión and Roque-García-Martínez
already existed.
In spite of the dramatic growth of tourism in the Spanish islands in
general, it was above all in the Balearic Islands, not the Canary Islands,
where indigenous family capitalism became prominent. In the decades
following the civil war there was a substantial transfer of human and
financial capital from the traditional industries (textiles and footwear) to
Spain’s principal industry, tourism. The Fluxà shoemaking family
remains a case in point. Their diversification started as early as 1950
with the founding of Viajes Iberia (now Iberojet, one of the big names in
the Spanish tourism business). The two other big names are Barceló and
Escarrer.
In Castile a very interesting restructuring process has taken place
since the mid 20th century. On the one side, the wool textile industry
around Béjar, in the Salamanca province, developed notably thanks to
increased investment from its Catalan partners. On the other, as the tra-
ditional wheat flour industry declined, new family firms appeared in the
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related fields of biscuits, pasta, pork meat, oil, chocolate, and dairy pro-
ducts. The evolution of those firms (Fontaneda, Gullón, Loste, Revilla,
Campofrío, Martínez, Dulciora, Trapa, Pascual and Elosúa) based first in
the local, then in the national and more recently in the international
market. Their adaptation to the liberalization of the Spanish economy
has not been easy due to competition from multinational groups and
traumatic succession processes: Fontaneda and Loste were sold to
Nabisco; Siro to Danone; Dyc to Osborne; Dulciora to Cadbury; Revilla
to Unilever and then to Campofrío. Surviving firms have successfully
managed succession processes, creating vertically integrated groups
(Pascual, Gullón and Campofrío), and eventually buying local firms
from foreign multinational groups (Fontaneda and Revilla). In New
Castile, south of Madrid, family firms faced the irreversible decline of
some industries (such as Albacete knives) and the development of food
and beverage industries such as Valdepeñas winemakers and cheese
makers García Baquero and Forlasa.
4. CONCLUSIONS
Family firms performed very dynamically during the golden age of
the managerial corporation. Spain is a strong case in support of this
argument. Today, half of the largest Spanish multinationals are family-
owned, half of the largest Spanish firms are family firms and almost 25
per cent of these large family firms are not the result of recent integra-
tion processes in the world markets, but heirs of a long tradition of sur-
vival and adaptation.
Like other large family firms around the world, they are highly spe-
cialized in market niches where they have built long term intangible
assets like reputation, brands, and negotiation skills, especially in food
and beverages, construction, engineering, chemicals and pharmaceuti-
cals, light metal industries, ceramics and fashion.
Our research reveals that most of them were established before the
golden age of capitalism and that the most fertile periods for the crea-
tion of enduring family firms were the first third of the 20th century and
the first two decades of Franco’s military dictatorship, two highly pro-
tectionist and isolationist periods of Spain’s economic history.
Among the key factors that explain this chronology we have stressed
the protectionist umbrella of the two dictatorships, and the exceptional
availability of markets for large Spanish firms —international markets
during World War I and the domestic market during the 1940s and
1950s—. The state indirectly benefited large family firms by providing
general labour and fiscal advantages and not considering certain sectors
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63 Currently Jordi Nadal is studying the history of Hispano Suiza. For Elizalde, Catalan
(2006).
64 Valls (2006).
strategic. The examples of car producers Hispano-Suiza (the Mateu
family) and Elizalde (the Elizalde family) reveal how difficult survival
could be in industries which were so attractive for the military authori-
ties 63. On the other hand, knowledge transfer was often possible becau-
se of the existence of a tradition of personal relationships with family
firms from other countries which preceded the civil war. Last but not
least in significance among the external factors affecting survival and
endurance, was regional endowment with natural and/or human resour-
ces which provided fertile ideas and resources (as the examples of
Freixenet or Codorniu reveal) 64. One should not underestimate the fle-
xibly innovative character of family firms (capable of sacrificing their
share of yearly profits for the long term survival of the family, as in the
cases of Carasso and Roca), team work within the family as in the case
of the Puig family of perfume manufacturers, and a common set of iden-
tity and interests with the different employees of the firm as the paper-
makers Miquel i Costas demonstrated.
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THE 245 LARGEST HISTORICAL FAMILY FIRMS AND GROUPS
IN SPAIN, 2005
Group Date of Turnover
Name Family foundation Sector (million euros) Employees
CATALONIA (84 FIRMS)
FCC Koplowitz 1900/1992 Construction 7,090 67,562
Celsa Rubiralta 1967 Metal 2,757 5,753
Caprabo Carbó 1959 Retailing 2,300 19,100
Roca Roca 1880/1929 Construction 1,669 16,000
(Sanitary
equipment)
Catalana Serra 1864 Insurance 1,502 2,824
Occidente
Cirsa Lao 1968 Gambling 1,155 11,000
Cobega Daurella 1951 F&B 1,125 1,411
Puig Puig 1914 Perfume 962 5,250
Almirall Gallardo 1944 Pharma 962 3,200
Planeta Lara 1949 Communication 960 4,725
Miquel Miquel 1925 F&B 836 3,700
Alimentació
Ficosa Pujol, Tarragó 1976 Motor 824 6,550
Esteve Esteve 1929 Pharma 818 2,469
Panrico Costafreda 1960s F&B 731 8,284
(sold 2006)
Damm Coll 1876/1910 F&B 656 1,785
Condis Condal 1961 F&B 652 4,650
Arbora Holding Carulla 1978 Chemicals 650 125
Comsa Miarnau 1934 Construction 642 1,030
Copisa Cornadó 1961 Construction 637 627
Molins Molins 1929 Construction 594 2,485
(concrete)
Borges Pont 1896 F&B 540 1,082
Grífols Grífols 1940 Pharma 524 3,443
Colomer Colomer 1924/2000 Perfume 486 2,310
Uniland Rumeu, Fradera 1896/1901/1973 Construction 472 1,01
(concrete)
Tarradellas Tarradellas 1983 F&B 424 950
Emte Sumarroca 1961 Construction 400 2,020
Freixenet Ferrer-Bonet 1861 F&B 379 1,323
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Group Date of Turnover
Name Family foundation Sector (million euros) Employees
Nutrexpa Ferrero 1940 F&B 327 1,333
Bon Preu Sau Font 1974 Retailing 315 1,918
Godó Godó 1881 Communication 311 1,500
Editorial Moll 1872 Communication 309
Prensa Ibérica
Mecalux Carrillo 1969 Construction 292 2,170
(logistics)
Ferrer Ferrer-Salat 1947 Pharma 274 1,174
Agrolimen Carulla 1937 F&B 261 520
Chupa Chups Bernat 1958 (sold 2005) F&B 260 1,170
Gallo Espona 1946 F&B 226 436
Vall Companys Vall Companys 1967 F&B 221 89
Ros Roca Roca 1953 Engineering 218 11
Codorniu Raventós 1872/1926 F&B 198 1,006
Soler y Palau Soler Palau 1951 Engineering 190 515
Grupo de Bonet 1965 Engineering 186 1,165
Estampación
Sabadell
Habitat Figueras 1953 Real estate 180 156
Torres Torres 1870 F&B 176 800
Frigicoll Coll 1967 Retailing 175 323
Hesperia Castro 1971 Tourism 171 3,300
Alimentaria Alsina 1959 F&B 168 174
de Guissona
Superficies de Sorli 1979 Retailing 165 1,130
Alimentación
HUSA Gaspart 1930 Tourism 162 2,800
Lacer Andress 1949 Pharma 160 600
Lípidos Santiga Soler 1968 Textiles 159 106
Miquel Miquel 1725 Paper 157 913
y Costas
Uriach Uriach 1838 Pharma 153 753
Simón Simón 1916 Electrical 145 930
equipment
Indo Cottet 1902/1937/8 Optics 144 1,722
y Colomer
Corporación Boada, 1981 Construction 143 1,025
Age Gummà, 
Masferrer
Colomer Colomer 1792 Leather 140 913
Munmany
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Group Date of Turnover
Name Family foundation Sector (million euros) Employees
Aceros Bergara Boixareu 1945 Metal 132 102
Titán Folch 1917 Chemicals 137 624
Synthesia Zuloaga 1964 Chemicals 127 203
Española





Campí y Jové Campí y Jové 1923 Chemicals 120 82
Basi Basi 1948 Fashion 111 415
Noel Bosch 1940 F&B 109 449
Cuatrecasas Cuatrecasas 1926 Legal services 106 350
Pronovias Palatchi 1922/1968 Textiles 103 23
Ausa Perramón 1956 Machine 98 353
Manufacturing
Comexi Cifra 1954 Machine 85 252
Manufacturing
Abressa Dude 1971 Construction 85 40
(concrete)
Espuña Espuña 1947 F&B 79 459
Goma Camps Goma Camps 1941 Paper 77 275
Sacresa Sanahuja 1960s Real estate 75 69
Sedatex Pich 1886-1940 Textiles 75 160
Colortex Taberner 1967 Textiles 75 686
Lamigraf Colomer 1975 Paper 70 205
e Ibáñez
Casademont Casademont 1960s F&B 69 485
Prefabricados Pujol 1979 Construction 68 78
Prensados (concrete)
Alier Alier 1934 Paper 68 259
Murtra Murtra 1897-1922 Textiles 67 316
Palex Knuth 1955 Chemicals 65 126
Inoxcrom Vaqué 1964 Paper 61 581
Galerías Tarragona 1965 Furniture 55 374
Tarragona
AC Marca Marca 1922/1999 Chemicals 52 254
Chocovic Rius 1977 F&B 45 120
(1872 Arumí)
Kettal Alorda 1964 Furniture 40 500
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Group Date of Turnover
Name Family foundation Sector (million euros) Employees
MADRID (35 FIRMS)
El Corte Inglés Álvarez, 1935/1940 Retailing 15,022 87,610
Koplowitz
Acciona Entrecanales 1931/1978/1997 Construction 4,852 21,846
Corporación Riberas 1989 Motor 2,395 10,439
Gestamp
Ebro Puleva Hernández (1911/1998) F&B 2,359 8,118
Sevelar Larrinaga 1964 Distribution 1,944 11
Bergé y Cia Bergé 1960 Motor 1,722 2,500
y Gorbeña
Prisa (Timón) Polanco 1958 Communication 1,425 9,114
(Santillana)
1972 (Prisa)
Gonvarri Riberas 1958 Metal 1,408 2,013
Industrial
Prosegur Gut 1976 Security 1,387 70,838
Grupo Villar Mir 1987 Construction 1,374 6,688
Villar Mir
Grupo SOS Salazar 1965 F&B 1,254 2,966
Recreativos Franco 1975 Slot machines 1,106 7,450
Franco manufacturing
Cortefiel Hinojosa 1951 Textiles 975 8,965
(sold 2005)
Eulen Álvarez 1962/1978 Services 877 58,733
Mahou Mahon 1889 F&B 800 2,109






Ferrovial Del Pino 1952/1927 Construction 760 3,500
Técnicas Lladó 1959 Engineering 685 2,336
Reunidas
Nueva Rumasa Ruiz Mateos 2000s F&B 600 16,000
Grupo Zeta Asensio 1976 Communication 451 2,342
Reyal Santamaría 1970 Construction 410 550
Grupo Sigla Arango 1965 Restaurants 340 5,108
Patentes Oriol 1942 Transports 299 1,844
TALGO
Europa & Isidro 1890 Paper 284 1,081
C. Cartones
de Castilla
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Group Date of Turnover
Name Family foundation Sector (million euros) Employees
Flex Beteré 1912/1925/1956 Bed equipment 182 1,500
Aceites Toledo Rubio 1965 F&B 140 62
Grupo Arturo Fernández 1898 Services 130 2,500
Cantoblanco
Hola Sánchez Junco 1944 Communication 123 140
Laboratorios Arochena (sold 1950 Chemicals 120 405
Indas 2007)
Grupo Radisa Díaz 1860 Construcction 84 353
Zeltia Fernández 1939/1991 Pharma 82 619
Sousa
Viajes Catai Torres 1980 Tourism 65 63
Grupo Einsa Martínez 1975 Communication 62 518
Electrónica Gimeno and 1975 Retailing 55 20
Olfer García
VALENCIA (28 FIRMS)
Mercadona Roig 1977 Retailing 10,338 53,600
Nefinsa Serratosa 1993 (previously Diversified 621 1,777
Valenciana de holding
Cementos 1917)
Ros Casares Ros 1950s Steel 612 655
Compañía Gómez Trenos,
Levantina Serratosa 1954 F&B 469 706
de Bebidas
Gaseosas
Grupo Guzmán Guzmán 1939 Metal 195 162
Pavasal Quesada 1956 Construction 194 730
Marina Flia y Ger 1983 Tourism and 182 1,189
d’Or-Loger real estate
Porcelanosa Soriano 1956/1963/1973 Construction 174 1,050
(ceramics)
Andrés Faus Faus 1953 Construction 158 345
Dulcesol Juan 1950s F&B 156 1,541
Famosa Rico, Molina, 1957 Toys 130 450
Sempere
Serra Serra 1972 Machine 126 735
Soldadura manufacturing
Ballesmar Ballester 1949 Construction 125 164
Taulell Gómez 1967 Construction 124 800
(ceramics)
Juan Fornés Fornés 1984 F&B 118 1,350
Fornés
Sáez Merino Sáez Merino 1952 Textiles 117 1,788
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Group Date of Turnover
Name Family foundation Sector (million euros) Employees
Durá Navarro Durá 1970s Construction 112 20
Keraben Benavent 1975 Construction 106 600
(ceramics)
Ecisa Peláez 1968 Construction 104 287
Gallego y Vilar Gallego 1964 Retailing 93 233
Grefusa Gregori 1980 F&B 93 664
Lladró Lladró 1954 Construction 82 1,000
(ceramics)
Fontesad Fontesad 1984 F&B 81 927
Rafael Hinojosa Hinojosa 1972 Paper 72 310
Hiperber Bernabeu 1970 Retailing 67 400
Fertilizantes Serrano 1979 Chemicals 62 46
e insecticidas
Chocolates López 1881/1973 F&B 49 266
Valor






Abengoa Benjumea 1941 Engineering 3,405 11,082
Grupo Sánchez Sánchez- 1970s Various 743 2,822
Ramade Ramade
Grupo Pra Romero 1961 Real estate 550 530
Grupo Noga Osuna 1962 Real estate 330 260
Osborne Osborne 1772 F&B 319 407
(Distribuidora
y Bodegas)
Grupo Amasua Suárez 1966 F&B 292 1,081
Mariscos Rodríguez 1971 F&B 246 346
Rodríguez
AZVI-Contreras Contreras 1925 Construction 246 775
Graciani
Consentino Martínez 1979 Minerals 241 1,380
Consentino
Grupo Manuel Barea 1983 Retailing 222 210
Barea
Persan Moya 1941 Chemicals 221 451
Grupo González González 1977 Retailing 209 224
Cabello Cabello
Grupo Ybarra Ybarra 1842 F&B 180 230
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Group Date of Turnover
Name Family foundation Sector (million euros) Employees
Alimentación Padilla 1976 F&B 172 410
Peninsular
Distribuidora Rodríguez 1982 Retailing 160 150
Mariscos
Rodríguez
Grupo Iturri 1947 Textiles 150 887
Industrial
Iturri
GP Manufactu- Bueno 1973 Metal 130 77
ras de Acero
Ángel Camacho 1897 F&B 107 557
Camacho
González Byass González 1835 F&B 101 350
Hierros Serrano Serrano 1972 Metal 77 240
Gámez
Grupo Luis Caballero 1830 F&B 67 201
Caballero
Grupo Joly Joly 1867 Communication 64 40
Almacenes González 1979 Retailing 56 100
Costasol
GALICIA (13 FIRMS)
Banco Pastor Barrié de la 1925 Banking 124,603 4,035
Maza-Arias       (net profits)
Pescanova Fdez. Sousa 1960 F&B 999 3,399
Calvo Calvo 1908 F&B 330 3,000
Jealsa Alonso 1958 F&B 314 3,060
Rianxeira
ACTEMSA Escurris 1987 F&B 110 60
Dielectro Lostale 1951 Retailing 108 375
Industrial
Maderas Iglesias 1985 Construction 105 580
Iglesias
Eduardo Vieira Vieira 1953 F&B 105 2,600
Hijos de Rivera Rivera 1906 F&B 100 265
(Cerveza
Estrella)
FINSA García 1931 Construction 94 254
Financiera
Maderera
Albo Albo 1869 F&B 73 387
Grupo Cuevas Cuevas 1978 F&B 72 398
Freire Freire 1943 Retailing 72 83
Hermanos
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Group Date of Turnover
Name Family foundation Sector (million euros) Employees
BALEARES (11 FIRMS)
Banca March/ March 1926 Banking 298,396
Corporación (net profits) 1,377
Financiera
Alba
Iberostar Fluxá 1930 Tourism 2,783 18,400




Sol Meliá Escarrer 1956/1987 Tourism 1,165 11,357
Barceló Barceló 1931/1960 Tourism 1,004 16,065
Riu Riu 1953 Tourism 900 16,000
Coflusa/Camper Fluxá 1981 Footwear 135 217
Vibrados y Brunet + 1968 Construction 88 28
Pretensados Mascaró (concrete)
Manacor
Distribuidora Rotger 1974 Retailing 87 436
Rotger
Viajes Quetglas 1975 Tourism 61 90
Sidetours
Hoteles Fiesta Matutes 1960s Tourism 42 568
ARAGÓN (11 FIRMS)








Álvarez Beltrán Álvarez 1979 Logistics 211 757
Pikolín Solans 1948 Bed equipment 182 1,393
Transportes Ochoa 1930s Logistics 141 1,117
Ochoa TOSA
Lecitrailer Reciñera 1990 Logistics 116 226
Heraldo Yarza 1909 Communication 91 465
de Aragón
Agreda Calvo 1927 Motor 82 5,260
Automóvil
Transportes Carreras 1930s-1968 Logistics 68 685
Carreras
Celulosa Blanchard 1946 Paper 66 245
Fabril CEFA
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Group Date of Turnover
Name Family foundation Sector (million euros) Employees
Lacasa Lacasa 1852 F&B 42 127
BASQUE COUNTRY (9 FIRMS)
Vidrala Delclaux 1965 Glass 297 1,114
Conservas Garavilla 1887 F&B 210 560
Garavilla
Cegasa Celaya 1934 Electrical 200 1,000
equipment
Corp. Patricio Echeverría 1908 Machine 187 1,887
Echevarría Manufacturing
Sener Sendagorta 1956 Engineering 151 918
Erhardt Erhardt 1882 Logistics 127 652
Minersa Lipperheide 1925/1942 Minerals 125 167
Marqués Hurtado de 1858 F&B 48 180
de Riscal Amézaga
Ramón Vizcaíno 1932 Freezing 46 395
Vizcaíno
CASTILLA-LEÓN (7 FIRMS)
Antolín Antolín 1959/1985 Motor 1,780 9,910
Leche Pascual Pascual 1969 F&B 992 4,300
Campofrío Ballvé 1952 F&B 911 2,500
Siro González Serna 1966 F&B 136 945
Helios Pérez 1900s/1936 F&B 99 210
Gullón Gullón 1892 F&B 92 350
Seda Solubles Alonso Cruz 1957 F&B 67 283
CASTILLA-LA MANCHA (5 FIRMS)
García Baquero García Baquero 1962 F&B 170 140
Félix Solís Solís 1950s F&B 146 278
Bodegas Navarro López 1904 F&B 139 35
Navarro
Forlasa Ortega 1970 F&B 111 244
Martínez
Delaviuda López, Rojas 1927 F&B 59 267
ASTURIAS (5 FIRMS)
Industrias Rodríguez 1960 F&B 454 841
Lácteas
Asturianas
Corporación Masaveu 1840 Various 391 5
Masaveu
Tudela Veguín Masaveu 1898 Construction 356 877
(concrete)
Alsa-Enatcar Cosmen 1923 Logistics 318 3,100
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Group Date of Turnover
Name Family foundation Sector (million euros) Employees
Martín Navarro Martín Navarro 1946 Retailing-F&B 146 644
and Ballester
RIOJA (4 FIRMS)
Conservas Baroja 1950 F&B 92 197
Cidacos
Grupo Indal Arias 1963 Electrical 83 950
equipment
Grupo Barpimo Ros 1959 Chemicals 65 500
Celorrio Celorrio 1950s F&B 53 18
MURCIA (4 FIRMS)
El Pozo Fuertes 1936 F&B 460 2,855
García Carrión García Carrión 19th century F&B 379 360




García Aranda García 1941 F&B 78 170
EXTREMADURA (3 FIRMS)
Banca Pueyo Pueyo 1890 Banking 4,671 204
(net profits)
Alfonso Gallardo 1960s Metal-mineral 110,16 225
Gallardo
López Morenas López 1943 F&B 43,78 89
CANARIAS (2 FIRMS)
José Sánchez Sánchez 1963 F&B 76 430
Peñate
Grupo Kalise- Suárez 1940 F&B 235 1,407
Menorquina
CANTABRIA (1 FIRM)
Banco de Botín 1857 Banking 6,220.104 129,196
Santander (net profits)
NAVARRE (1 FIRM)
Victorio Luzuriaga 1898 Motor 50 363
Luzuriaga
Sources: Actualidad Económica, 2006, SABI, and corporate websites.
Notes:
1. The firms and groups of firms in this table fulfil three requirements: a) they were family-controlled
firms in 2005; b) they were historic, counting on the involvement of a second generation; c) they had a turnover
in excess of 40 million euros in 2005.
2. F&B = Food and Beverages.
3. Visible members of the IEF (Instituto de la Empresa Familiar) are in bold.
4. Since 2005 Chupa Chups, Panrico, Uniland and Caprabo in Catalonia have sold out and lost their family
status. The cases of Cortefiel and Grupo Indas in Madrid are similar.
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TABLE 2
FOUNDATION DATE OF THE 245 LARGEST HISTORICAL FAMILY FIRMS
IN SPAIN, 2005
Number of
Region Before 1900 1900-1939 1940-1975 After 1975 firms and %
of total
Catalonia 15 18 43 8 84 (34,28%)
Madrid 5 5 18 7 35 (14,28%)
Valencia 2 1 17 8 28 (11,42%)
Andalusia 6 1 9 6 22 (8,97%)
Galicia 1 4 5 3 13 (5,30%)
Aragón 1 5 3 2 11 (4,48%)
Balearic Islands 0 3 6 2 11 (4,48%)
Basque Country 0 3 5 1 9 (3,67%)
Castilla-León 1 1 5 0 7 (2,85%)
Castilla-La Mancha 0 2 3 0 5 (2,04%)
Asturias 2 1 2 0 5 (2,04%)
Murcia 1 1 2 0 4 (1,63%)
Rioja 0 0 4 0 4 (1,63%)
Extremadura 1 0 2 0 3 (1,22%)
Canary Islands 0 0 2 0 2 (0,81%)
Cantabria 1 0 0 0 1 (0,40%)
Navarre 1 0 0 0 1 (0,40%)
Total Spain 37 (15,10%) 45 (18,36%) 126(51,42%) 37 (15,10%) 245 (100%)
TABLE 3
MAIN ACTIVITY OF THE 245 LARGEST HISTORICAL FAMILY FIRMS,
SPAIN 2005
Sector Number of firms and % of total
Food and Beverages 72 (29,38%)
Construction 35 (14,28%)
Retailing 21 (8,57%)
Chemicals and Pharmaceuticals 17 (6,93%)
Auxiliary industries 17 (6,93%)
Tourism 12 (4,89%)





Source: Same as Table 1.
Other includes banking, legal services, insurance, gambling, real estate, paper, optics, leather,
furniture, security, toys, bed equipment, and logistics.

